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 Deforestation and credit cycles in Latin American 
countries 
Abstract 
This paper establishes a link between deforestation and credit cycles in Latin American 
countries. The latter exhibit rapid deforestation rates as well as macroeconomic instability that 
is often rooted in credit booms and crunches episodes: data available on the last years show a 
coincidence between higher macroeconomic instability and deforestation increases. This 
paper provides a theoretical explanation and econometric investigations of this phenomenon.  
A key ingredient of the model is the existence of two sectors: a modern agricultural sector 
and a subsistence one, which are hypothesised to catch the basic features of Latin American 
agricultural sectors. Agricultural production relies on three production factors: land, capital 
and labour. Agents clear forested areas in order to increase agricultural lands. Interest rates 
movements have an effect on agricultural decisions and thus on deforestation since they 
induce factor movements between the agricultural sectors. It is shown that deforestation 
occurs in response to interest rates increases or decreases primarily because of the irreversible 
character of forest conversion. 
Econometric tests are conducted on the 1948-2005 period on an exhaustive sample of Latin 
American countries. The database on deforestation is a compilation of FAO censuses and 
several measures of credit cycles are calculated as well. The main output of the paper is to 
evidence a link between credit cycles and deforestation. The results are robust to the 
introduction of usual control variables in deforestation equations. 
Keywords : Credit cycles, Deforestation, Latin America 
JEL : Q23, O13, O11 
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1.  Introduction 
Latin American countries experience a rapid deforestation: annual average deforestation 
rates in the most recent periods are twice the world’s ones: 0.46% versus 0.22% over the 
1990-2000 period and 0.51% versus 0.18% over the 2000-2005 period.1 Since primary forests 
in these countries account for 56% of the world’s primary forests, the Latin American paces 
of deforestation raise particular concern and emerge as an international issue related to global 
warming and loss of biodiversity.2 Forest preservation sustains the objectives of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Convention and delegates who met in 
Bali in late 2007 agreed to consider standing forests as a device against global warming. Latin 
American countries have expressed their interest in participating in a Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility. Moreover, forest preservation in Latin American countries meets also the 
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity in as much as at least 10 Latin American 
countries have more than 1,000 native tree species (FAO, 2007) and a great amount of species 
extinction occurs in tropical environments (Myers, 1993).  
National initiatives remain however important but rely on the understanding of the 
deforestation process which has been extensively studied. According to Geist and Lambin 
(2002), “source” or “proximate” causes of deforestation relate mainly to economic activities 
taking place at the local level such as investments in infrastructure and road networks 
(Angelsen, 1999; Chomitz & Gray, 1998), expansion of cattle ranching and agricultural 
activities (Barbier, 2004b) and finally commercial logging (Van Kooten & Folmer, 2004). 
Geo-ecological factors such as soil quality, rainfall and temperature conditions are considered 
as “predisposing” factors of deforestation which condition the links between “proximate” and 
“underlying” causes. The latter operate mainly at the macro level and are related to social 
processes and economic policies such as the population pressure (Bilsborrow & Carr, 2001; 
Cropper and Griffiths, 1994), landownership and income distributions, national and regional 
development strategies (Koop and Tole, 2001), agricultural research and technological change 
as well (Southgate et al. 1990). The poor quality of institutions tends to accompany 
deforestation. Weakness of property rights creates incentives to capture rents generated by 
forest extraction (Deacon, 1999). Inappropriate rules of law may incite forest dwellers to 
                                                 
1 These figures are not strictly comparable to the figures calculated in the paper (see Table 2 in the statistical 
appendix) since FAO’s deforestation rates are calculated by summing annual variations of forest areas. Moreover 
Mexico is not included in the figures reported by the FAO. 
2 Climate change from forest conversion may also occur locally (Tinker, Ingram & Struwe, 1996) and preserving 
biodiversity also yields domestic benefits (Chomitz & Kumari, 1998) 
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become agents of deforestation (Southgate & Runge, 1990). Moreover, bribes and agricultural 
lobbies generate rural subsidies that both encourage low agricultural productivity and 
deforestation (Bulte, Damania and López, 2007). 
Other studies have highlighted the role played by macroeconomic - fiscal, exchange rate 
and / or sectoral - policies in the deforestation process (e.g. Anderson, 1990). Exchange rate 
depreciation promotes exporting sectors and by the way forest conversion. Exchange rate 
variations may however have an ambiguous impact on deforestation, depending on their 
permanent or transitory patterns (Arcand et al. 2007). The terms of trade affect deforestation 
of timber exporting countries. An improvement in the terms of trade may be the result of an 
increasing demand for timber products. If a country relies on its export earnings, an increase 
in the terms of trade will reduce the long term forest stock (Barbier & Rauscher 1994). 
Openness may however dampen the effect of population pressure on forests when giving new 
opportunities for the economy (Hecht et al. 2006). Debt is also an important issue for 
deforestation in developing countries. Debt can induce myopic behaviours and foster forest 
depletion especially when a country must meet its international financial commitments (Culas, 
2006). However debt for nature swaps may impede such a process (Kahn & Mac Donald, 
1994). The evidence for Latin American countries is not however clear cut. Gullison and 
Losos (1993) assert that agricultural and timber exports did not increase with growing 
external debt. It is hard to isolate the peculiar role played by the external debt among other 
macroeconomic factors in land degradation in the 80’s. Moreover, debt repayments may have 
been responsible for drastic public spending reductions in infrastructures provision that have a 
positive effect on deforestation.  
This paper provides further investigations into underlying causes related to a peculiar 
macroeconomic feature of Latin American countries. For many years, the latter are subject to 
credit cycles defined as successive expansion and slowdown phases in the supply of credit 
and thus in its opportunity cost. Latin American countries experienced credit stagnation in the 
late 90s (e.g. Barajas and Steiner, 2002), which coincides with an increase in deforestation 
rates. One can wonder whether there exists a causal relationship between credit cycles and 
deforestation. The ambiguous consequences of credit expansion on deforestation are 
examined in the literature. On the one side, credit allows financing investments in 
infrastructures that boost deforestation (Pacheco, 2006; Ferraz, 2001; Culas, 2003). On the 
other side credit facilitates the adoption of intensive agriculture which is less forest 
consuming (Angelsen, 1999; Caviglia-Harris, 2003). This paper concentrates rather on the 
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consequences of credit cycles. Credit cycles are deemed to modify relative prices, and thus 
are expected to influence resources allocation between sectors in accordance with their capital 
intensities. It is argued that both credit expansions and credit crunches may have positive 
effects on deforestation i.e. credit cycles foster deforestation. This proposition is formalized 
with a two sectors model which posits a modern agricultural sector and a subsistence one. 
This dual economy model is hypothesised to catch the basic features of Latin American 
economies which exhibit a deforestation path in the long run. Agricultural production relies 
on three production factors: land, capital and labour. Economic agents clear forested areas in 
order to increase their land plots. Interest rates movements pour financial instability into 
agricultural decisions. It is shown that deforestation occurs in response to interest rates 
increases and decreases as well primarily because of the irreversible character of primary 
forest conversion. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts forwards stylised facts 
relating deforestation and credit cycles in Latin America. Section 3 offers a theoretical 
framework of the engines of deforestation. Section 4 provides some econometric results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Deforestation and credit cycles in Latin American countries 
2. 1.  Why focusing on credit cycles effects? 
Latin American countries have experienced pronounced credit cycles characterised by 
phases of strong acceleration of credit growth (credit or lending booms) followed by a drastic 
reduction in credits (credit crunches) from world war II onwards (e.g. Caballero, 2000; 
Gourinchas, Valdés, & Landerretche, 2000). The first three decades (50s to 70s) are marked 
by a rapid credit expansion, with several deceleration episodes (see Figure 1 in the statistical 
appendix). Tight credit policies in the 80s are combined with financial repression in the 
aftermath of the debt crisis. The financial liberalisation in the late 80s spurred a credit 
expansion in the early 90s followed by a credit stagnation episode since the late 90s (Barajas 
& Steiner, 2002). More generally, credit cycles either occur with economic policies reversals 
(e.g. the brazilian experience of tight credit against inflation in the 60s - Randall, 1997; or the 
adoption of the Basel Accord in the 90s – Barajas et al. 2004) or international liquidity 
availability as well (e.g. petrodollars in the 70s – Amado et al., 2006). Braun and Hausmann 
(2002) show that the frequency of credit crunches is higher in Latin America than in other 
developing countries; moreover these credit crunches are deeper in magnitude and relatively 
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long-lived. They also argue that the recent episodes of credit crunches have been more 
frequent and severe than before. Credit cycles are thus a prominent feature of Latin American 
countries for many years and are a key ingredient of their macroeconomic instabilities.  
Why Latin American countries are particularly prone to these credit crunch and credit 
boom periods? Three pieces of explanation can be put forward and are related to (i) financial 
markets characteristics, (ii) exchange rate shocks and currency crises, and (iii) monetary 
policies. 
Poor financial development3 is a salient character of Latin American countries (Caballero, 
2000 among others).4 This was the case from the 50s until the late 80s, i.e. from state led to 
liberalised financial markets. Underdeveloped financial markets are prone to moral hazard. A 
poor banking supervision leads depositors to withdraw their funds in periods of recession. 
Moreover, economic agents have a limited access to collaterals due to the poor property rights 
especially on land. Therefore, moral hazard is exacerbated during economic crises and the 
collateral valuation has a pro-cyclical behaviour (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Latin 
American countries implemented financial liberalization after financial repression periods, in 
order to encourage financial deepening. The latter however created disturbances into credit 
markets and may be the ‘proximate’ cause of financial crises in the late 80s (Mas, 1995). 
Financial liberalization may thus have failed to eliminate moral hazard problems. The latter 
are spawned by persistent implicit or explicit bailout guarantees which exacerbate the 
tendency toward high risk projects (Caballero, 2000). Last, the operating costs of the financial 
system remain high in Latin American countries (Brock & Rojas Suarez, 2000). 
The structure of balance sheets of Latin American firms raises their vulnerability to 
exchange rate shocks. A currency mismatch occurs when an entity’s net worth or income is 
sensitive to changes in the exchange rates. The asset is labelled in the local currency but the 
mortgage in dollars (stock aspect); the incomes generated by the asset are in the local 
currency but the repayments are due in dollars (flow aspect). The net present value of 
investments financed by foreign funds is sensitive to exchange rates fluctuations 
independently of the fundamental parameters of the investment project. Therefore, the banks’ 
liquidity and then their credit supply are affected by exchange rate fluctuations. 
                                                 
3 It is measured by M3 to GDP or loans to private sector to GDP.  
4 One exception is Chile which is however characterised by a thin financial market which leverages interest rates 
movements (Caballero, 2004) 
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At last, the size and frequency of credit cycles may be explained by the weakness of 
countercyclical policies. For instance, Latin American countries have hardly implemented 
countercyclical monetary policies. Capital controls allow theoretically countercyclical 
monetary policies under a fixed exchange rate regime. Such a situation was prevalent in Latin 
American countries from the 50s to the 80s, but populist regimes were very reluctant to rely 
on that kind of policy. At last, the adoption of floating exchange rates does not allow strong 
countercyclical monetary policies due to the “Original sin” effect (Eichengreen, Hausmann, 
and Panizza, 2003). Indeed, when countries borrow in dollars, exchange rates movements 
may have large wealth effects. In this context Central Banks can hardly prevent liquidity 
crises since base money issues would lead to a huge increase of the debt service through 
exchange rate depreciation. 
Admittedly, credit cycles are associated with business cycles but one may easily think 
about sectoral effects as well. It is argued here that credit cycles are of peculiar importance for 
environmental issues for different reasons. First, credit cycles are considered to be symptoms 
of financial constraints (e.g. Caballero 2000) i.e. to be closely linked with credit rationing 
which is still perceived by rural households despite ‘market friendly’ reforms in the 
agricultural sector (Boucher et al. 2005). In such a situation, credits are allocated mainly to 
large landowners who can justify substantial collaterals i.e. lands, consume relatively more 
land and thus are more readily able to clear the forest (Southgate and Whitaker, 1998). Second, 
credit cycles spur on asset prices and thus land prices variations which may affect 
deforestation. Third, credit cycles may be the pretext to public interventions aimed at 
providing peculiar public goods like forested lands or subsidized credits to the agricultural 
sector. In this paper it is argued that interest rates’ movements also have an effect on 
deforestation through factor reallocations within the agricultural sector. 
2. 2.  Patterns of deforestation in Latin America 
Annual deforestation rates between 1948 and 2005 are reported in Table 3 in the statistical 
appendix from available FAO censuses.5 Data frequency on forests allows calculating only 
period averages on the beginning of the time period. At the end of it, although annual data are 
available, period averages are calculated since annual data are often interpolations. 20 
countries are included in the sample within each period, except the first one where forest 
                                                 
5 Data sources are reported in Table 2 in the statistical appendix 
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coverage statistics are only available in 7 countries.6 Among the 20 Latin American countries 
included in the sample, there are 4 Caribbean, 7 Central American and 9 South American 
countries. Deforestation rates in Latin American countries differ sharply across space. A 
simple and preliminary decomposition of the deforestation process show that idiosyncratic 
factors are at work. This can be shown by estimating a regression equation of average annual 
deforestation rates on periods and country fixed effects. The magnitude of idiosyncratic 
factors may be inferred from the calculation of 1-R2 of the regression. The latter is 0.82 which 
must be interpreted as an upper bound on the variance of independent idiosyncratic factors 
since the total variability may also be the result of measurement errors.  
Deforestation rates are high during the 50s, the 60s and the 70s, then drop in the 80s and 
increase sharply since the second half of the 90s. High rates of deforestation in the 50s and 
60s did not raise particular concern in this post-war period which was characterised by the 
overwhelming goal of economic growth and great optimism (Edwards, 1995). Large parts of 
primary forests disappeared with for instance the destruction of the Atlantic rainforest in 
Brazil due to coffee plantations expansions (Thorp, 1998). Import substitution strategies (ISS) 
have been conducted in the 50s and the 60s in many Latin American countries. Although they 
gave a non negligible importance to mining and forest products industries (Randall, 1997), it 
is considered that they reduced natural resource use by promoting industrial sectors. 
Nevertheless, despite the ISS’ anti-agricultural bias, it is alleged that ISS gave less incentives 
to conserve natural resources. For instance, land was under-utilized in large agricultural 
establishments of which lands may have encroached on forested areas and the management of 
environmental base in agriculture was more depletive (Barham et al. 1992; Southgate & 
Whitaker, 1992). 
If we compare deforestation figures among countries, the highest deforestation rates are 
found in Central American countries. Among the seven countries that exhibit an average 
deforestation rate over the whole period greater than 1%, five are Central American 
countries. 7  Costa Rica experienced for instance the highest rates from the fifties to the 
beginning of the eighties, illustrating the predominant views of economic development in 
                                                 
6 Among 24 potential Latin American countries, 3 countries are dropped (Chile, Surinam and Uruguay) since 
they exhibit a forestation profile throughout the period. Argentina is also dropped since deforestation has taken 
place only on the last 2 periods. 
7 These countries are El Salvador, Costa-Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; the remaining countries being 
Jamaica and Paraguay. 
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Latin America: agri-business exportation sector, import substitution strategy until the 
structural adjustment programs which stopped deforestation in the early 80s. Since then, 
forest preservation initiatives have greatly reduced the pressure on forests (de Camino et al., 
2000). The same story is at work in Nicaragua and Honduras which have considerably 
developed their beef exports. The proximity of the United States has stimulated the demand 
for agricultural and cattle products. The Latin American Agri-business Development (LAAD) 
Corporation is deemed to have contributed to the process when pouring large amounts of 
capital into Central American countries in the 60s. 
2. 3.  Is there really a link between deforestation and credit cycles 
episodes?  
Once we have seen the importance and the main characteristics of credit and deforestation 
dynamics is there a way to put together these two series of stylized facts? First, there is no 
obvious correlation between the highest country average deforestation rates and the most 
pronounced credit cycles episodes. Among the seven countries having high deforestation rates, 
only one (Nicaragua) is also characterised by a strong credit instability as measured by 
standard errors of credit growth rates (see Table 4 in the statistical appendix). Second, the 
coincidence between periods of high deforestation and credit cycles is not clear-cut: it seems 
that credit booms are associated with an acceleration of deforestation, but this correlation is 
contradicted in the last period that is characterised by a tightening of credit and an increase in 
deforestation. This result is not surprising since many idiosyncratic factors affected credit 
cycles during the last decades. Among these factors it can be mentioned that financial reforms 
were implemented at different times (Edwards, 1995),8 but political factors played of course a 
prominent role.9 If we look at country-period data, the link between deforestation and credit 
cycles remains unclear: there is only 22% of coincidence between the highest deforestation 
figures and the highest credit growth rate instabilities. 
Moreover, any simple correlation between deforestation speeds and credit growth rate 
instabilities must be cautiously interpreted. Indeed (i) simple correlations do not allow 
drawing causal links between deforestation and credit cycles, (ii) measuring credit cycles 
implies defining a long term or potential credit, and (iii) it is hard to disentangle the effects of 
the different stages within credit cycles (i.e. credit booms and credit crunches). These 
                                                 
8 Chile and Mexico were among the first reformers in the mid-80’s while Dominican Republic and Ecuador 
liberalised only in the mid-90’s. 
9 For instance, the army implemented a sharp tightening of credit when it seized the power in 1964 in Brazil 
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difficulties elicit three constraints to test relevantly the existence of a causal relationship 
between deforestation and credit cycles: (i) the need to use multivariate regressions (ii) the 
need to define credit cycles as the gap between its current value and a trend, and (iii) the need 
to distinguish the impact of credit booms from credit crunches’ ones. 
3.  Deforestation model 
Let us consider an agricultural economy made of two sectors. 10  The first one is a 
“subsistence” sector and the second one is a “modern” sector. The subsistence sector has a 
production function G which uses land HG and labour LG only. Formal land property rights 
barely exist and impedes access to credit markets: capital accumulation cannot occur. Despite 
all these constraints, economic agents are deemed to maximise their profits according to the 
“poor but efficient” hypothesis (Schultz, 1964). It is hypothesised that the subsistence sector 
is representative of shifting or “slash and burn” agriculture. It consists in periodic clearing of 
forested areas for short periods of cultivation interrupted by long fallow periods which are 
essential for fertility restoration, weeds control and forest regeneration (secondary or 
degraded forest) purposes. Population pressure reduces fallow periods and generates deep 
advances in forested areas (Metzger, 2003). The modern sector has a production function F 
depending on three production factors: land HF, labour LF that equals L-LG, and capital K. 
Property rights are well defined and secured and capital can be accumulated since economic 
agents can use land as collateral. The modern sector pictures agricultural and or livestock-
keeping activities that may have an access to formal and or international agricultural markets. 
The modern sector output is sold at price p; the numéraire is the output price of the 
subsistence sector.  
Both production functions have positive and decreasing marginal productivities, and non 
increasing returns to scale. They satisfy Inada conditions and allow factors substitutions. In 
addition, cross second derivatives are non negative. Labour moves freely from one sector to 
another one with a constant total supply L. Both sectors share a common wage w that induces 
labour allocation in the economy. Capital use is determined by its opportunity cost r which 
includes a rental rate and an agency cost. Land is a specific factor of which prices are hG and 
h
F in the subsistence and modern sectors respectively. It is assumed that land markets are 
poorly developed. Hence hG and hF represents clearing marginal costs, opportunity costs 
                                                 
10 Many researchers emphasised the dual character of Latin American agriculture (e.g. Dorner & Quiros, 1973; 
Horowitz, 1996) 
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generated by forest depletion and conflict costs within local populations. The land factor 
specificity is determined by localization, soil quality, and legal statute differences. For 
example, people concerned by subsistence (or traditional) agriculture, are located in the forest 
whereas modern agricultural activities take place rather in pioneer fronts. This specificity 
implies that land input variations in one sector are not compensated by opposite variations in 
the other.  
Tropical rainforest is mainly considered as a non renewable resource. Hence, deforestation 
is an irreversible process which is mainly the result of agricultural land encroachments (FAO, 
2007) from the subsistence and modern sectors. Increases in HF or HG are defined as 
deforestation (e.g. Barbier and Burgess, 2001) whereas decreases in HF or HG are increases of 
fallow lands or degraded forests. Fallow lands provide several products and services and 
allow raising cattle which increases the value of land (Fujisaka et al. 1996). It may be thus 
profitable even in the modern sector, not to reduce them under increasing demand for 
agricultural land.  
Two models are presented. The first one allows land input adjustments in the modern 
sector. This hypothesis is relaxed in the second one. Land fixity in the modern sector can be 
justified in three ways. Modern agriculture is not land extensive: agricultural output increases 
can be the result of capital and / or labour increases. Legal constraints may also prevent land 
extensions in this formal sector. Moreover, land encroachments in tropical rainforest may be 
prohibitive: lack of infrastructures, clearing costs, costly land improvements in cleared areas. 
In the second model, the subsistence sector is the only cause of deforestation. For instance, in 
Central America capital intensive agricultural establishments had few impacts on forest 
resources. Forest clearance was mainly the result of increased pressure generated by 
subsistence farmers in areas endowed with a rich biodiversity and forests (Carr et al. 2006). 
3. 1.  Two engines of deforestation: modern and subsistence 
sectors’ expansions 
In a context where land is a choice variable in both sectors, the profit maximization is 
made upon HF, HG, LG and K: 
( ) ( ) FFGGFGGG
HHKL
HhHhrKwLKHLLpFHLG
FGG
−−−−−+≡pi ,,,max
,,,
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Subscripts indicate first derivatives and stars the optimum values in the first order 
necessary conditions: 
0
*
=
∂
pi∂
GL
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) 0,,, ***** =−− KHLLpFHLG FGLGGL      (1) 
0
*
=
∂
pi∂
K
 ⇔ ( ) 0,, *** =−− rKHLLpF FGK        (2) 
0
*
=
∂
pi∂
GH
 ⇔ ( ) 0, ** =− GGGT hHLG         (3) 
0
*
=
∂
pi∂
FH
 ⇔ ( ) 0,, *** =−− FFGT hKHLLF        (4) 
Provided the sufficient order condition holds, the optimal choice functions are implicit 
functions of the parameters and especially of r. The comparative static exercise is interpreted 
as the simulation of a credit crunch (boom) when dr is positive (negative).11 Taking into 
account the sufficient second order condition and the properties of production functions, the 
results are the following: 
0>
dr
dL
sign
G
; 0>
dr
dH
sign
G
; 
dr
dK
sign  ambiguous; 
dr
dH
sign
F
 ambiguous  
An increase in r unambiguously increases the output in the subsistence sector. The latter is 
obtained by labour and land inputs increases. According to (3) HG and LG move the same way. 
Indeed, an increase in labour input LG induces an increase of the marginal productivity of land 
( 0* >HLG ): the optimum is restored by an increase in H
G ( 0* <HHG ). 
The opportunity cost r has an ambiguous effect on land inputs and capital in the modern 
sector. Additional hypotheses can be put forward to solve this ambiguous effect. Indeed if 
**
LLLL pFG +  is strongly negative then labour reallocation towards the subsistence sector 
induces a sharp decrease in the marginal profitability of labour. The optimum can be restored 
in three ways: an increase in HG, a decrease in HF or a decrease in K. The first two ones are 
insufficient if cross derivatives *LHG  and 
*
LHF  are negligible. Then, a decrease in K restores 
the optimum (equation 1).  
                                                 
11 See in the mathematical appendix the derivation of the second order conditions and the comparative static 
exercise.  
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According to equation (4), a decrease in K induces a decrease in the marginal productivity 
of land in the modern sector ( 0* >HKF ). This effect is magnified by a decrease in labour inputs 
in the modern sector ( 0* <− HLF ). The optimum will be restored by a decrease in H
F 
( 0* <HHF ). Since labour, capital, and land inputs decrease in the modern sector, the output is 
negatively affected by a credit crunch. 
According to equation (2), the increase in the marginal productivity of capital induced by r 
is obtained by a decrease in K since LF and HF decrease.12 
The total effect of the credit crunch on deforestation is positive in as much as waste lands 
in the modern sector cannot compensate forest clearing in the subsistence sector.  
A credit boom represented by a decrease in r induces deforestation as well. Indeed, it 
generates an increase in the output in the modern sector which is forest consuming. Although 
land inputs decrease in the subsistence sector, they cannot be compensated for.  
Deforestation is generated whatever the change in r. This result relies heavily on the non-
substitutable character of land inputs in subsistence and modern sectors. Deforestation is 
driven by small (subsistence) agriculture in credit crunch episodes whereas it is driven by 
large-scale (modern) agriculture in credit boom episodes. 
3. 2.  One engine of deforestation: subsistence sector’s expansion 
In a context of land fixity for the modern sector, the profit maximization is made only upon 
L
G, K and HG: 
( ) ( ) FFGGFGGG
HKL
HhHhrKwLKHLLpFHLG
GG
−−−−−+≡pi ,,,max
,,
 
Subscripts indicate first derivatives and tildes the optimum values in the first order 
necessary conditions: 
0
~
=
∂
pi∂
GL
 ⇔ ( ) ( ) 0~,,~~,~ =− KHLpFHLG FGLGGL       (5) 
0
~
=
∂
pi∂
GH
 ⇔ ( ) 0~,~ =− GGGH hHLG         (6) 
                                                 
12 There theoretically exists another story which looks however paradoxical. Indeed according to (2), an increase 
in r can induce an increase in HF. According to (4), HF and K move accordingly. In that situation, a credit crunch 
generates a counterintuitive increase in K. 
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0
~
=
∂
pi∂
K
 ⇔ ( ) 0~,,~ =− rKHLpF FGK         (7) 
Provided the second order condition holds with a strict equality, the implicit function 
theorem applies. The profit and the optimal choice functions depend on the parameters. The 
same comparative static exercise is done (i.e. a credit crunch (boom) occurs when dr is 
positive (negative) of which results are not ambiguous:13  
0
~
>
dr
Ld
sign
G
; 0
~
>
dr
Hd
sign
G
; 0
~
<
dr
Kd
sign  
An increase in r unambiguously increases the output in the subsistence sector. The latter is 
obtained by labour increases and deforestation. The output in the modern sector decreases. 
When r decreases, land use decreases i.e. waste lands increase. In this model capital increases 
compensate for decreases in land and / or labour inputs. Credit crunches fuel deforestation. 
On the contrary, credit booms do not induce deforestation. But credit cycles and more 
generally macroeconomic instability characterised by successive credit booms and crunches 
fuel deforestation.  
4.  Application to Latin American countries 
4. 1.  Data and econometric specification 
The dependant variable is the rate of deforestation from FAO censuses and databases. It is 
computed over five years periods to mitigate annual and random measurement errors in 
deforestation data.14 All explanatory variables are also five years averages which allow taking 
into account delays in adjustment processes.  
As in other emerging countries, credit crunch may be mainly supply driven. Admittedly 
credit crunches can theoretically be triggered by reductions in loan demand. This is the case 
when investments returns fall sharply, and one expects that loan demand reductions imply 
declining interest rates. This scenario is not in the context of developing and emerging 
countries. Why? An explanation can be put forward when considering moral hazard and 
adverse selection on credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Asymmetric information 
between lenders and borrowers generates credit rationing: there is structurally an excess 
demand for loanable funds since borrowers cannot raise their interest rates in order not to 
                                                 
13 The calculations are reported in the mathematical appendix 
14 Except for the first period, 1948-1958 and the last one: 1999-2005  
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affect the riskiness of borrowers and / or project financed by borrowed funds. In that context, 
the equilibrium quantity of credit is determined by supply shifts. Information asymmetries and 
hence credit rationing are arguably stronger in developing and emerging countries than in 
industrialized ones. Moreover interest rates were largely managed in Latin American 
countries until the eighties (e.g. Barajas and Steiner, 2002). 
In this context, the opportunity cost of borrowing is better captured by variations of credit 
flows than by interest rates. This motivates the calculation of a credit gap based on the real 
total domestic credit series (i.e. nominal value of credit deflated by the CPI index). This credit 
gap is calculated yearly as the difference between actual and potential real credit, expressed in 
terms of potential real credit and then averaged over the period. Positive (negative) values are 
interpreted as credit booms (crunches). Since credit booms and credit crunches may have a 
different impact, a dummy variable is introduced which is set to 0 for a credit boom and 1 for 
a credit crunch. This dummy variable is then multiplied by the credit gap. 
Potential real credit is calculated with the Hodrick Prescott filter (HP) which minimizes the 
deviation from a trend under a constraint that penalizes the variability of the trend. The 
smoothing parameter (Lagrange multiplier) is set to 100 as suggested by Hodrick and Prescott 
and used by Barajas and Steiner (2002) to identify credit cycles in Latin America. As a 
robustness test, alternative credit gaps are computed using a different smoothing parameter 
(150) which strengthens the linear trend.15 Moreover, an alternative way of computing the 
credit gap is tested, by comparing the actual real credit growth rate to the potential annual 
growth rate of the GDP in Latin American countries.16 This potential credit growth rate is 
assumed to be homogeneous among countries and equal to 3% or 5%. 
As detailed above, deforestation is also determined by some structural factors and by 
others aspects of macroeconomic policy, which allow taking into account two groups of 
explanatory variables. The first group includes GDP per capita and squared GDP per capita 
(both expressed in logarithms) in order to test the Environmental Kuznets Curve assumption.  
Numerous studies provide ambiguous results: Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) or Culas (2007) 
                                                 
15 Gourinchas et al. 2001 use a parameter set at 1,000 but with a rolling trend which use only information 
available at time t. 
16 The use of the difference between the credit growth rate and the current GDP growth rate as a proxy of an 
“excess supply of credit” (instead of the potential growth rate) would not be relevant since current GDP growth 
is itself determined by current credit growth. 
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do not reject the hypothesis whereas Meyer, Van Kooten and Wang (2003) do. Barbier’s 
results (2004a) on a Latin American sample depend on the set of control variables. Initial 
forest area (in logarithms) and population density allow testing the impact of relative scarcity 
of forest resources. A measure of economic openness (ratio trade over GDP) is also 
introduced. The effect of crop prices and wood prices (sawnwood) is tested as well insofar as 
deforestation may be driven by an increase in the agricultural and forestry profitability. These 
variables are taken as export unit values deflated by the American consumer price index.  
The second group aims at capturing the effects of macroeconomic policy through relative 
price variations, i.e. CPI inflation rate and the bilateral real exchange rate with the United 
States.17 This choice of a bilateral real exchange rate is justified by the concentration of Latin 
American countries international trade with the USA. Moreover, most prices of primary 
commodities exported by these countries are denominated in US dollars. 
The estimation of deforestation determinants is made using country-specific and time-
specific fixed-effects.18 These fixed-effects allow capturing the effects of omitted variables 
that are constant over time (constant measurement errors, country characteristics, i.e. 
geographical factors such as landlockness, cultural factors) and of omitted variables common 
to the different countries of the sample (agricultural commodities and forest products prices, 
energy prices, world interest rates…). It may be noticed that the credit gap is a generated 
19variable, which may cause an invalid inference. Nevertheless, when the generated regressor 
is a residual, the estimated variance of the coefficient remains correct and hence bootstrapping 
is not needed (Pagan, 1984). 
 
                                                 
17 The real exchange rate is calculated as follows : 1990
,
1990
,
1990
,/$
1990
, /. titUSAtiti PPINERRER =  where 
1990
,/$ tiINER is an index of 
the value of one US dollar expressed in national currency units using 1990 as a base year, and 1990
,tUSAP  and 
1990
,tiP  
are consumer price indexes, respectively in the United States and in country (i). A rise in the real exchange rate 
index thus corresponds to a real depreciation. 
18 The Hausman test run on the baseline regression rejects at the 1% level the random effect model. Period and 
country fixed effects are respectively significant at 5% and 1% levels. 
19 Most explanatory variables are extracted from the IMF data base. Crop and wood prices are from the FAO 
data base (FAOSTAT Archives Trade Indices, 2006).  
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Table 1. Determinants of deforestation in Latin America (1948-2005) 
 
Explanatory variables PLS Panel Least Squares LAD 
Structural factors 
 
(1) (2) 
(a) 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Real GDP per capita (Log) 0.25 
(5%) 
0.25 
(5%) 
0.29 
(2%) 
0.27 
(5%) 
0.28 
(3%) 
0.29 
(2%) 
0.29 
(2%) 
0.32 
(3%) 
0.35 
(17%) 
0.17 
(1%) 
Squared real GDP per capita 
(Log) 
- 0.03 
(6%) 
- 0.03 
(6%) 
- 0.03 
(2%) 
- 0.03 
(5%) 
- 0.03 
(3%) 
- 0.03 
(2%) 
- 0.03 
(2%) 
- 0.04 
(3%) 
-0.04 
(16%) 
- 0.02 
(1%) 
Initial Forest area (Log) 0.04 
(2%) 
0.04 
(2%) 
0.04 
(2%) 
0.04 
(1%) 
0.04 
(1%) 
0.04 
(1%) 
0.04 
(1%) 
0.04 
(1%) 
0.07 
(1%) 
0.03 
(1%) 
Population density 0,11 
(26%) 
0,10 
(28%) 
0,10 
(34%) 
0,10 
(29%) 
0,10 
(34%) 
0,10 
(35%) 
0,10 
(35%) 
0,11 
(28%) 
-0.10 
(62%) 
0,09 
(2%) 
Openess (Trade/GDP) 
 
1,3.10-4 
(42%) 
1,2.10-4 
(49%) 
1,3.10-4 
(39%) 
1,2.10-4 
(46%) 
9,2.10-3 
(44%) 
1,2.10-4 
(43%) 
1,2.10-4 
(43%) 
1,6.10-4 
(28%) 
5.1 10-4 
(3%) 
1,1.10-5 
(82%) 
Wood prices         0.02 
(36%) 
 
Agricultural prices         -5.4 10-4 
(74%) 
 
Macroeconomic policies           
CPI inflation 
 
6,3.10-4 
(32%) 
7,0.10-4 
(29%) 
6,7.10-4 
(35%) 
       
Real exchange rate 
  
-9,0.10-8 
(99%) 
2,1.10-6 
(94%) 
 -3,5.10-6 
(90%) 
      
Real Credit growth rate  
 
8,9.10-3 
(15%) 
5,7.10-3 
(52%) 
  9,2.10-3 
(13%) 
  0,04 
(8%) 
  
Average credit gap  
 
3,0.10-4 
(10%) 
2,6.10-3 
(49%) 
5,6.10-5 
(9%) 
6,6.10-5 
(5%) 
3,0.10-4 
(6%) 
6,1.10-5 
(6%) 
-4,1.10-3 
(1%) 
 9.1 10-5 
(5%)) 
2,9.10-5 
(87%) 
Average credit gap  
* dummy (gap < 0) 
-7,1.10-3 
(1%) 
-6,5.10-3 
(5%) 
- 3,9.10-3 
(1%) 
- 4,0.10-3 
(1%) 
- 7,6.10-3 
(1%) 
-4,2.10-3 
(1%) 
  -3.2 10-3 
(9%)) 
- 0,06 
(1%) 
Average credit gap  
* dummy (gap > 0) 
      4,2.10-3 
(1%) 
   
Real Credit growth rate * 
Dummy (growth rate < 3%) 
(b) 
       - 0,05 
(6%) 
  
R2 adjusted 29% 28% 29% 30% 30% 30% 30% 32% 38% 29% 
Observations 147 147 151 151 151 153 153 153 111 153 
Periods included 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 
Countries (c) included 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 20 
p-values in parenthesis, Coefficients significant at the 10% level in bold. t are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. (a) Credit cycles are computed using a 
smoothing parameter equal to 150 instead of 100; (b) the use of a 5% threshold gives similar results; (c) when the real exchange rate is introduced, Guyana is dropped from 
estimations since the real exchange rate is not available.  
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4. 2.  Structural variables 
Regardless of the set of macroeconomic policies variables included, similar results are 
found on structural variables (table 1). First, the results suggest the existence of an 
Environmental Kuznets Curve: deforestation increases with the level of development when 
GDP per capita is smaller than 4160$, then decreases beyond this threshold. Second, the 
coefficient associated with the initial forest area is positive and statistically significant, thus 
showing a convergence phenomenon in the deforestation process. The estimated convergence 
parameter allows calculating that half the difference between actual and steady states values 
of forested area is squeezed in 17 years, other variables held constant. Third, population 
density and openness variables are both insignificant. As regards density, one could have 
expected a positive impact on deforestation in our sample since Central America countries 
exhibit both higher rates of deforestation and population growth (Bilsborrow and Carr, 2001). 
Given the strong inertia of demographic factors, the impact of density variations may be 
captured by country fixed-effects. Besides, Arcand et al. (2007) found similar results and 
suggest that the impact of these variables could operate through relative prices. Agricultural 
and forest products’ prices are only available from 1961 onwards, dropping about 40 
observations from the sample. The variables are not significant (column 9 in table 1) since 
their effects may be caught by temporal fixed effects which allow controlling for common 
trends in international crop and forest products’ prices. Whether these structural variables are 
kept or not does not alter the results.20 
4. 3.  Macroeconomic policy 
As regards the impact of macroeconomic policies, inflation, and the real exchange rate are 
both insignificant (column 1 in table 1). This result persists when macroeconomic policy 
variables are tested separately to reveal multicolinearity problems (columns 3 and 4). The lack 
of impact of real exchange rate variations is unexpected. It suggests that the driving force of 
deforestation is not the production of tradable goods in the sample. These variables are 
therefore dropped from the subsequent regressions (column 5 and following). 
More interestingly, the coefficient associated with the credit gap is positive but weakly 
significant. When it is however multiplied with a dummy variable corresponding to a credit 
                                                 
20 Institutional quality is also taken into account since the Economic Freedom index from the Fraser Institute 
may be considered as a potential control variable. The time coverage only begins in 1970 and thus drops 3 of the 
10 periods included in the sample. The non significant effect of this variable must be cautiously interpreted.  
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crunch, the estimated coefficient is negative and strongly significant. The marginal impact of 
negative credit gaps is given by the sum of the coefficients, and is negative (around – 0.005). 
By introducing a dummy corresponding to positive gap instead of a negative one, it is 
checked that this marginal impact is significant (column 7). This confirms the theoretical 
prediction of the second model, i.e. that credit crunches accelerate deforestation while credit 
booms do not. In others words, deforestation is driven by credit crunches episodes, but credit 
booms do not protect forests. This result is robust to the introduction of the real credit growth 
rate (columns 1, 2 and 5). The occurrence of a 14% credit crunch (1st quartile value) 
contributes to an additional 0.06% annual deforestation, which corresponds to 8% of total 
deforestation (column 6).21 This result enlightens that macroeconomic policies may have a 
significant short-term impact on deforestation dynamics. 
The asymmetric impact of credit growth is unchanged if credit cycles are defined using a 3 
or a 5 percent threshold (corresponding to the long run potential GDP growth) instead of the 
HP filter residual (column 8, and note (c)). 
The Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) estimator (column 10) gives the median regression 
and hence provides results weakly sensitive to potential outliers. The standard errors are 
calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap method. Results are qualitatively similar to the 
Panel least Squares estimations: only credit crunches affect significantly deforestation.22 
5.  Conclusion 
Economists have not been tempted to link deforestation and credit cycles in Latin 
American countries. This can be explained by the weak simple correlation between these two 
phenomenons. Peculiar characteristics of Latin American countries may however motivate 
further investigations since many Latin American countries are land abundant, exhibit rapid 
deforestation rates often experience macro instability that is often rooted in credit boom and 
crunches episodes. Recent available data show a coincidence between higher financial 
instability and deforestation increases. This paper provides a theoretical explanation and 
empirical investigations of this phenomenon. Econometric tests are conducted on the 1948-
2005 period on an exhaustive sample of Latin American countries. The deforestation database 
is derived from a compilation of censuses carried out by the FAO. Moreover, various 
                                                 
21 Computed as the product of the marginal impact of credit crunches (0.005) multiplied by the mean value of 
credit crunches (0.08). 
22 Population density affects significantly deforestation in the LAD estimation. 
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variables measuring credit cycles are calculated. The main output of the paper is to evidence 
the impact of credit cycles on deforestation. Precisely, it is shown that the deeper the credit 
cycles, the higher the deforestation rates. The results are robust to the introduction of usual 
control variables. 
This paper confirms the role of short-term macroeconomic policies on deforestation and 
thus shows that the macroeconomic instability may have broader negative effects than that is 
usually acknowledged. It is not only detrimental to growth and welfare, but has also a 
negative effect on the environment through an increase in deforestation. Therefore the 
efficiency of usual instruments of environmental policies (taxation, norms and property 
rights) may be enhanced by macroeconomic policies aiming at downsizing credit cycles.  
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Statistical appendix 
 
Table 2: Forest data sources (1948 -2005) 
 
Survey Survey Year References Data 
 
FOREST RESOURCES OF 
THE WORLD  
 
1948 
 
Unasylva, Revue internationale des forêts et des produits 
forestiers, Vol. 2(4), juillet-août, 1948 
 
1948 
 
WORLD FOREST 
INVENTORY  
 
1958 
FAO. 1960. World forest inventory 1958 - the third in the 
quinquennial series compiled by the Forestry and Forest 
Products Division of FAO. Rome. 
1958  
 
 
WORLD FOREST 
INVENTORY  
 
1963 
 
FAO. 1966. World forest inventory 1963, Rome 
1963 
 
FAO stat  
 
Various 
issues 
FAO stat. CD-rom version 1998 (available between 1989 and 
1994 on the FAO website 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/418/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=418) 
1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 
1988, 1993 
FOREST RESOURCES 
ASSESSMENT – Interim 
report 
 
1990 
 
FAO 1993. Forest Resources Assessment 1990 - Tropical 
countries. FAO Forestry Paper No. 112. Rome. 
 
1998 
FOREST RESOURCES 
ASSESSMENT – Interim 
report 
 
1995 
 
FAO. 1997, State of the World's Forests, Rome 
 
1998 
 
FOREST RESOURCES 
ASSESSMENT 
 
2005 
FAO. 2005, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005: Progress 
towards sustainable forest management, FAO Forestry 
Paper 147, Rome 
(or www.fao.org/forestry/site/fra2005/fr) 
 
 2005 
 
Note: In order to keep a five-year frequency until the last period, 1998 is calculated by interpolating the forest 
cover between 1995 (or 1990, depending on availability and consistency of data) and 2000  
 
Table 3. Average annual rates of deforestation in Latin American countries 1948 – 2005, percentages 
  
48-57 58-63 64-68 69-73 74-78 79-83 84-88 89-93 94-98 99-05  
Belize CA 1,51 0,28 0,13 0,70 0,74 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,34 
Costa-Rica CA   3,79 2,52 2,88 3,37 4,20 0,61 -0,26 1,01 0,33 2,05 
El Salvador CA   4,22 2,04 1,11 2,67 4,30 2,96 0,00 1,88 2,22 2,38 
Guatemala CA 2,93 0,15 0,57 0,59 1,23 0,91 -2,13 -0,83 1,56 1,79 0,68 
Honduras CA   2,72 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,71 4,32 1,19 
Mexico CA   -0,10 0,94 0,99 1,04 1,38 -0,75 -0,29 0,68 0,63 0,50 
Nicaragua CA   0,70 1,84 2,03 2,26 2,50 2,80 2,33 1,44 1,71 1,96 
Panama CA   3,11 0,65 0,67 0,69 1,71 2,65 0,79 0,19 0,13 1,18 
Dominican Rep CAR   0,12 0,30 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,32 0,62 0,00 0,00 0,25 
Haiti CAR   0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,91 1,01 0,21 
Jamaica CAR   11,26 0,48 0,49 0,50 0,51 0,53 0,21 0,16 0,16 1,59 
Trinidad & Tobago CAR 2,60 0,51 0,41 0,42 0,43 0,43 0,44 -1,14 0,40 0,32 0,48 
Bolivia SA   0,28 0,42 0,43 -0,19 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,59 0,63 0,24 
Brazil SA 1,50 0,24 0,34 0,39 0,44 -1,11 -0,39 0,21 0,60 0,74 0,30 
Colombia SA 0,37 3,39 0,15 0,68 0,36 0,00 0,18 0,56 -0,22 -0,03 0,54 
Ecuador SA   -3,64 1,27 1,23 0,19 0,00 0,00 -0,13 2,00 2,34 0,36 
Guyana SA 0,01 -0,08 0,00 0,00 1,55 0,55 0,00 -0,16 0,11 0,04 0,20 
Paraguay SA   -0,52 0,23 0,24 0,24 1,93 4,46 2,98 0,23 0,88 1,19 
Peru SA   1,38 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,17 0,19 0,19 
Venezuela SA   3,32 0,77 0,81 0,84 -1,80 -3,19 -0,89 0,39 0,56 0,09 
  1,49 1,56 0,65 0,70 0,83 0,79 0,42 0,20 0,79 0,90 0,80 
Source: Authors’ calculations from several issues of FAO censuses CA: Central American country, CAR: 
Carribean country, SA: South American Country 
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Table  4. Credit growth rate standard errors in Latin American countries 1948 – 2005 
  48-58 59-63 64-68 69-73 74-78 79-83 84-88 89-93 94-98 99-05  
Belize CA       0,09 0,13 0,09 0,13 0,11 
Costa-Rica CA 0,11 0,12 0,05 0,14 0,11 0,31 0,07 0,10 0,26 0,07 0,13 
El Salvador CA 0,19 0,11 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,12 0,24 0,19 0,12 0,10 0,13 
Guatemala CA 0,17 0,08 0,07 0,09 0,05 0,08 0,12 0,07 0,09 0,08 0,09 
Honduras CA 0,25 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,13 0,10 0,12 0,11 
Mexico CA 0,10 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,08 0,22 0,18 0,05 0,28 0,03 0,11 
Nicaragua CA     0,08 0,25 0,51 1,88 0,11 0,03 0,48 
Panama CA 0,12 0,11 0,07 0,04 0,10 0,06 0,10 0,13 0,07 0,08 0,09 
Dominican Rep CAR 0,26 0,13 0,08 0,03 0,12 0,01 0,16 0,17 0,09 0,14 0,12 
Haiti CAR  0,05 0,09 0,06 0,02 0,07 0,13 0,10 0,05 0,15 0,08 
Jamaica CAR  0,35 0,12 0,12 0,14 0,17 0,10 0,28 0,17 0,32 0,20 
Trinidad & Tobago CAR  0,38 0,08 0,08 1,18 1,33 0,10 0,07 0,15 0,07 0,38 
Bolivia SA 0,42 0,04 0,05 0,09 0,31 0,49 1,25 0,14 0,13 0,05 0,30 
Brazil SA 0,06 0,10 0,17 0,11 0,13 0,12 0,40 0,39 0,34 0,09 0,19 
Colombia SA 0,12 0,14 0,08 0,04 0,10 0,13 0,10 0,15 0,08 0,04 0,10 
Ecuador SA 0,11 0,10 0,08 0,11 0,06 0,22 0,13 0,67 0,19 0,23 0,19 
Guyana SA          0,07 0,07 
Paraguay SA  0,08 0,09 0,04 0,10 0,13 0,06 0,34 0,06 0,15 0,12 
Peru SA 0,06 0,02 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,21 0,24 0,32 0,27 0,10 0,15 
Venezuela SA 0,49 0,16 0,07 0,06 0,15 0,07 0,10 0,21 0,23 0,22 0,18 
  0,190 0,122 0,082 0,078 0,164 0,225 0,218 0,291 0,152 0,113 0,16 
Source: Authors’ calculations from IFS. 
 
Figure 1. Annual growth rates country averages of real credit 
(five-year moving average in bold) 
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Source: Author’s calculations from IFS 
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Mathematical appendix 
* The Hessian matrix evaluated at the maximum in the first model (modern and subsistence sectors’ 
expansions) is the following:  














−
−
−−+
≡pi
***
**
***
*****
*2
0
00
0
HHHKHL
HHHL
KHKKKL
LHLHLKLLLL
pFpFpF
GG
pFpFpF
pFGpFpFG
D  
The sufficient second order condition for a maximum implies that the Hessian must be negative definite. That 
means in particular that 0*2 >piD . The optimal choice functions are implicit functions of the parameters and 
especially of r. The comparative static exercise on r allows simulating credit crunch (boom) when dr is positive 
(negative). When totally differentiating the first order conditions, the system of equations of four unknowns is 
the following: 














=

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
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







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









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−
−
−−+
0
0
1
0
0
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0
***
**
***
*****
drdH
drdH
drdK
drdL
pFpFpF
GG
pFpFpF
pFGpFpFG
F
G
G
HHHKHL
HHHL
KHKKKL
LHLHLKLLLL
  
The Cramer’s rule allows deriving the optimal responses to changes dr (stars omitted) taking into account the 
sign of the Hessian and the hypotheses on the production functions: 
( )LHTKHHLKHHTTG FFGpFFGpsign
dr
dL
sign 22 +−−=  which is positive 
( )HHLKHLLHHKHLG FFGpFFGpsign
dr
dH
sign 22 +−−=  which is positive  
( ) ( ) ( )( )222 HLHHHHHLHHHHLLLL FGppFGpFGpFGsign
dr
dK
sign −−+=  which is ambiguous 
( ) ( )( )HHHKLLLLHHLKHLHKHLF GpFpFGGFFpFGpsign
dr
dH
sign +−+= 22  which is ambiguous  
* The Hessian matrix evaluated at the maximum in the second model (subsistence sector’s expansion) is the 
following: 









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−
−+
=pi
KKKL
HHHL
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0
~
0
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~~~~
~2
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The sufficient second order condition for a maximum implies that the Hessian must be negative definite. That 
means in particular that: 
0~2 <piD  and ( ) ( ) 0~~~~ 2 >−+ LHHHLLLL GGFpG  which is the determinant of the second principal minor. 
Next differentiating totally the first order conditions delivers the following system of equations of three 
unknowns: 










=




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














−
−+
1
0
0
~
~
~
~
0
~
0
~~
~~~~
drKd
drHd
drLd
FpFp
GG
FpGFpG
G
KKKL
HHHL
LKLHLLLL
 
The Cramer’s rule allows deriving the optimal responses to changes dr: 
( )LKHHG FGpsign
dr
Ld
sign
~~
~
−−=  which is positive  
( )LKHLG FGpsign
dr
Hd
sign
~~
~
−−=  which is positive  
( ) ( )( )2~~~~~ LHHHLLLL GGFpGsign
dr
Kd
sign −+−=  which is negative by the second order sufficient condition 
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